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NOTHING COULD BE FINER?:  
THE ROLE OF AGENCY GENERAL COUNSEL 
IN NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA 
Elizabeth Chambliss* & Dana Remus** 
 
Agencies can get away with a lot of shit. You make a decision and if no 
one calls you on it, it goes on for twenty years. In my old life [private 
practice], when you make a decision, the other person will immediately 
call you on it.1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is amazingly little contemporary research on the counseling 
function of government agency lawyers.  Most research on federal 
government lawyers focuses on the Department of Justice2 (DOJ), the 
Attorney General3 (AG), or the birth of the modern administrative state 
during the New Deal.4  Much of this work focuses on the organization of 
 
*  Professor of Law and Director, NMRS Center on Professionalism, University of South 
Carolina School of Law.  Thanks to Duncan Alford, Joe Looby, Laurel Terry, and the 
participants at the Fordham Law School colloquium Lawyering in the Regulatory State for 
helpful comments on this Article.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, 
Foreword:  Lawyering in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016). 
**  Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. 
 
 1. Interview with Agency Lawyer 2 (2015) [hereinafter I2] (transcript on file with 
authors). For an explanation of the interview process and the notation system used to identify 
sources, see infra note 15. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular:  Government Role of the Agency 
General Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS:  THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143, 143 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995) (noting that “the 
Department of Justice monopolizes academic attention”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The 
Creation of the Department of Justice:  Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil 
Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121 (2013) (reviewing the historical literature on the DOJ). 
 3. See Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction:  Politics and the Legal Bureaucracy, in 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS:  THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, supra 
note 2, at 25 n.3 (reviewing the literature on the U.S. Attorney General’s office, and 
observing that most studies are historical or biographical in nature). 
 4. See, e.g., PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982) (chronicling the 
influence of agency lawyers on national policy during the New Deal); Barry Cushman, 
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 249–55 (1994) (discussing the role of 
lawyering in determining the fate of particular New Deal initiatives); Neal Devins, 
Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 258 (1996) (book review) 
(discussing the resistance of “talented New Deal lawyers” to Roosevelt’s 1933 
reorganization of the Justice Department). 
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federal litigation authority.5  At the state level, likewise, recent scholarship 
focuses on the litigation function of state attorneys general.6  Meanwhile, 
we know very little about the agency counseling function or the role of 
agency counsel in shaping agency policy and practice. 
The role of state agency general counsel is an important topic.  State law, 
and state administrative law in particular, affects everyday life in countless 
ways.  State agencies are principally responsible for education, land use, 
roads, occupational licensing, public health, social services, and the 
administration of many grant and benefit programs.  Most people, including 
lawyers,7 interact more with state agencies than federal agencies, and the 
structure and authority of state agencies varies.8  Thus, state-level research 
may offer new insights into the administrative process and the role of 
lawyers in policymaking.9 
The counseling function of state agency lawyers is especially important.  
Like corporate counsel, agency general counsel are positioned to provide 
day-to-day, front-end advice about a wide range of issues.  In the absence of 
litigation, much of this advice is not reviewed.  Agency counsels’ 
interpretation of statutes and regulations may significantly shape formal 
law—or create an institutional precedent that affects the de facto 
implementation of state law for years to come.  Agency counsel also have 
significant influence over the make-or-buy decision and the choice of 
private counsel for agency litigation.10 
 
 5. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice 
Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 559 (2003) (arguing that a primary 
purpose behind the creation of the DOJ was “to eliminate the reliance on private lawyers in 
litigation”); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies As Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 
616 (2013) (evaluating arguments for vesting agencies with litigation gatekeeping authority). 
 6. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys 
General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100 (2015) 
(examining state variations in the duty to defend); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public:  Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 
(2012) (examining the role of state attorneys general in aggregate litigation); Margaret H. 
Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests:  Attorneys General As Amici, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (2015) (examining the growing activism and ambitions of state 
attorneys general). 
 7. Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law:  A Critical 
Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95, 100 (1982) (“[M]ost lawyers in this 
country . . . spend as much or more time dealing with state administrative processes as they 
do with the federal process.”). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1755 
(2010) (“[M]ethodology is already moving across the systems, and [] state court 
developments may be changing the terms of the statutory interpretation debate in ways that 
may be far more productive than anything currently happening in the federal arena.”); see 
also Bonfield, supra note 7, at 95 (“Consideration of state law would stimulate important 
insights into the administrative process that cannot be obtained from federal materials 
alone.”). 
 10. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016) (examining the increasing use of private lawyers and/or private 
financing for government litigation at the state and local levels, and analyzing the costs and 
benefits). 
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Yet because the work and structure of authority in each state agency is so 
different, agency general counsel tend to operate in a professional vacuum, 
with no immediate peer group among attorneys and many other potential 
sources of authority.11  Michael Herz has referred to the position of agency 
general counsel as “the attorney particular”12 and has argued that “no other 
government attorney sits at such a confluence of conflicting pressures.”13  
Thus, agency counsel have broad discretion, but little accountability or 
guidance. 
This Article examines the role of agency general counsel in North and 
South Carolina.  The two states offer a rich comparative context for 
research on agency general counsel.  Though closely linked in both name 
and culture,14 they have different executive structures and recent political 
histories, and the agency counseling function has evolved and is currently 
organized in different ways.  These structural and political differences at the 
state level illuminate commonalities and differences at the agency level and 
provide an accessible starting point for broader state-level research. 
Our account draws on interviews with current and former agency 
counsel, agency directors, and lawyers in the state Attorney General’s 
office,15 as well as roundtable discussions among agency counsel on topics 
of common interest.16  Part I examines the structural evolution of the 
agency general counsel position and the functional division between in-
house agency counsel and the Attorney General’s office.  Part II examines 
the characteristics and career paths of lawyers who serve as agency general 
counsel and identifies sources of authority in their roles.  Part III outlines 
questions for future research. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE AGENCY COUNSELING FUNCTION 
One explanation for the lack of research on the agency counseling 
function is the unruliness of executive government and the relative lack of 
 
 11. See Herz, supra note 2, at 143. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Sheet Music:  Carolina in the Morning Song, held by Johns Hopkins 
University, the Lester S. Levy Collection of Sheet Music.  North and South Carolina have 
sparred over which state the song is about, but lyricist Gus Kahn’s grandson, Andy Marx, 
tactfully claims that his grandfather “loved both Carolinas.” Nothing Could Be Finer than to 
Be in Carolina, AM. PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.thestory.org/stories/2013-
03/nothing-could-be-finer-be-carolina [https://perma.cc/4G86-3LRS]. 
 15. We conducted nineteen semi-structured interviews between August and December 
2015.  Most interviews were conducted in person and lasted about ninety minutes.  To 
preserve confidentiality, we do not label respondents by state or position, but simply refer to 
them by number, I1 through I19.  All pincites are to the transcripts of the interviews, which 
are on file with the authors. 
 16. We held four roundtables for agency general counsel and other senior agency 
lawyers between October 2014 and October 2015.  The roundtables lasted two hours and 
ranged in size from eight to twenty-two participants.  Because the initial roundtables 
preceded (and to some extent inspired) our research, we did not include them in our research 
design and do not quote participants directly; however, the discussions provided useful 
background for our research. 
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codification of many aspects of agency authority and practice.  Even what 
constitutes an executive agency is a controversial topic.17  At the federal 
level, “[n]o coherent pattern explains Congress’s decisions to locate some 
cessions of government authority within the executive and others with an 
independent agency.”18  Paul Verkuil has characterized the process as one 
of “random selection.”19  Efforts to centralize litigation authority in the 
DOJ have been, in broad terms, successful,20 but also periodic, partial, and 
riddled with agency carve-outs.21  Meanwhile, there is no pretense of 
centralization of the counseling function.22  At the federal level, agency 
counseling is marked by “entrenched decentralization.”23 
The situation in the states is equally messy.  On the one hand, in both 
states there is evidence for a narrative about the rationalization24 of 
executive government through the consolidation of an unwieldy assortment 
of hundreds of agencies, boards, and commissions—many under partial 
legislative control—into a limited number of cabinet and other executive 
agencies.25  Over time, in both states, most executive agencies have come to 
employ specialized in-house counsel under the title “general counsel,” 
“chief counsel,” or something similar; currently, all but three executive 
agencies in North and South Carolina employ in-house general counsel.26  
Moreover, in both states, agency general counsel recently have initiated 
 
 17. See Clayton, supra note 3, at 25 n.2 (defining “executive agencies” as those 
“charged with carrying out the law,” rather than as a category defined by executive control). 
 18. Neal Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent 
Agencies, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS:  THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL 
POLITICS, supra note 2, at 183. 
 19. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
257, 258. 
 20. See Herz, supra note 2, at 144–45 (stating that the 1870 effort to centralize litigation 
authority in the DOJ “never quite took hold” but was eventually accomplished by executive 
order in 1933 and later codified); see also 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) (“Except as otherwise 
authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, and agency, or officer 
thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing of evidence therefor, is reserved to the 
officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”); Exec. 
Order No. 6,166 (1933). 
 21. See Devins, supra note 18, at 186 (stating that “[t]he fragmentary quality of 
independent agency litigating authority is typical, not exceptional”). 
 22. Herz, supra note 2, at 147 (“The silence of both the executive order and the statute 
with regard to the counseling function by implication cemented its decentralization.  No 
pretense of control by the attorney general was even made.”). 
 23. Id. at 150. 
 24. In sociology, “rationalization” refers to the replacement of traditions, values, and 
emotions as motivations for behavior with rational, calculated motivations. 1 MAX WEBER, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. 
trans., 1968).  The development of government bureaucracies is an iconic example. 3WEBER, 
supra, at 1156; see also Rationalization (sociology), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Rationalization_(sociology) (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZFK3-
97HX]. 
 25. Both states distinguish between cabinet agencies, in which the director is appointed 
by the governor, and other executive agencies, in which the director is elected or appointed 
by an independent commission or board. See infra APPENDIX A, B. 
 26. Altogether, there are forty-two executive agencies in the two states and thirty-nine 
employ in-house counsel. See infra APPENDIX A, B. 
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efforts to form professional networks—for instance by developing 
professional directories and best practice manuals and holding periodic 
roundtables to discuss questions of common interest.27  Such efforts point 
to the increasing professionalization28 of agency general counsel, similar to 
that of corporate counsel in the 1970s and 1980s29 and law firm general 
counsel in the 1990s and 2000s.30 
On the other hand, there is a lot of sausage-making.  In both states, 
governors and attorneys general have used executive organization and 
reorganization as a political tool, creating and moving functions and 
positions—and papering over inconvenient incumbents—to achieve greater 
political control.  In South Carolina, a so-called legislative state with a 
historically weak executive branch31 and reliably Republican politics,32 the 
Governor’s primary agenda has been to wrest governing authority from the 
legislature through the gradual consolidation of agencies under executive 
control and the concomitant expansion of in-house agency counseling.  In 
North Carolina, partisan politics have played a more visible role,33 with 
 
 27. I2, supra note 1, at 21; Interview with Agency Lawyer 10, at 12 (2015) (transcript on 
file with authors); Interview with Agency Lawyer 16, at 6 (2015) [hereinafter I16] (transcript 
on file with authors). 
 28. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 1515, 1517–18 (2006) (using the term “professionalization” broadly to refer 
to “the process by which an occupational group becomes increasingly specialized, organized, 
and autonomous, developing distinct knowledge claims, titles, associations, and career 
tracks”); see also George Ritzer, Professionalization, Bureaucratization and Rationalization:  
The Views of Max Weber, 53 SOC. FORCES 627, 632 (1975) (noting that bureaucracies and 
professions develop through a similar process of rationalization). 
 29. See generally Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in 
Lawyering for a Global Organization:  The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1057, 1059–66 (1997) (discussing the growth in the number of corporate counsel in the 
1970s and 1980s and the expansion of their “regulatory counseling” function); Robert Eli 
Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational 
Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989) (discussing the professionalization of corporate 
counsel). 
 30. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of 
Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002) (tracking the emergence of the law firm general counsel 
position); Chambliss, supra note 28 (examining the professionalization of firm counsel). 
 31. Until 1865, the governor of South Carolina was elected by the legislature. 1 JAMES 
LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA:  THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 89 (1986).  South Carolina was the last 
state to make the governorship a popularly elected position. Levona Page, State Slowly 
Reversing Historical Tide, STATE, June 15, 1993, at 12A. 
 32. MARTIN GUEVARA URBINA, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY DYNAMICS OF 
MULTICULTURALISM 94 (2014) (referring to South Carolina as a “reliably Republican” state); 
see also Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 2105 & n.16 (distinguishing between “states 
with stable political coalitions (what we call red and blue states), [in which] voter 
preferences, attorney general priorities, and state law generally align” and “purple states,” 
which “frequently experience divided party control”). 
 33. See Richard Fausset, North Carolina, in Political Flux, Battles for Its Identity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/us/north-carolina-in-political-
flux-battles-for-its-identity.html?_r=0 (“The North Carolina of 2014, it seems, is neither red 
nor blue, but a shade of deep Dixie purple.”) [http://perma.cc/N5RD-75X8].  President 
Obama won the state in 2008, but two years later, Republicans won control of both houses of 
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governors and their political rivals struggling over agency policy and the 
control of agency counsel.  Thus, in both states, the evolution of the agency 
counseling function simultaneously reflects a gradual process of 
bureaucratic rationalization and the idiosyncratic, sticky remnants of 
specific political contests. 
A.  Consolidation of Executive Agencies 
In the late 1960s, North Carolina had over 200 independent agencies.  
Recognizing the resulting unruliness, the General Assembly undertook a 
reorganization of state government.34  It proposed a constitutional 
amendment, approved by the general electorate on November 3, 1970, 
which called for the executive branch to be reduced to not more than 
twenty-five departments by the end of 1975.35  This shift was effectuated 
through two rounds of legislation, in 1971 and 1973, which produced the 
current organization of Council of State and cabinet agencies.36  Countless, 
though far more minor, alterations, reorganizations, and name changes have 
occurred since that time.  As the 2013 North Carolina state manual 
explains:  “Reorganization has become a predictable, on-going feature of 
state government’s executive branch since 1971.  Department names have 
changed, missions and mandates have been altered and some agencies, such 
as the Office of State Controller, have been given autonomous status.”37 
Currently, North Carolina has nineteen executive agencies.38  Eight are 
cabinet agencies, whose directors are appointed by the Governor,39 eight 
are Council of State agencies, whose directors are popularly elected,40 and 
three are independent agencies.41  All but one of the agencies has in-house 
general counsel.42  In addition, over 400 boards and commissions operate 
 
the General Assembly for the first time in over a century, and in 2013, a Republican (Pat 
McCrory) took office as governor for the first time in twenty years.  Many pockets of the 
state remain liberal, however, producing significant political tensions.  Emblematic of the 
tension, Attorney General Roy Cooper, a Democrat, has already announced his plans to 
challenge Governor McCrory in the gubernatorial election of 2016. Karyn Bruggeman, 
McCrory Unveils Reelection Campaign Team, ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.the 
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/mccrory-unveils-reelection-campaign-team/458961/ 
[https://perma.cc/QWU4-JEZ9]. 
 34. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 134 (2011–12). 
 35. Id. at 82, 85. 
 36. Executive Reorganization Act of 1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143A (2014); Executive 
Reorganization Act of 1973, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B (2014). 
 37. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 34, at 136. 
 38. See infra APPENDIX A. 
 39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-9. 
 40. N.C. CONST. Art. III, § 7, cl.1. 
 41. Members of the State Board of Elections are appointed by the Governor. OFFICE OF 
THE SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 34, at 261.  The Director of the Office of the State 
Controller is appointed by the Governor with the approval of the General Assembly. Id. at 
258.  The Office of Administrative Hearings is a quasi-judicial body whose head, the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge, is appointed by the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme 
Court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-752. 
 42. See infra APPENDIX A.  The remaining agency, the Office of the State Controller, 
relies exclusively on the Attorney General’s office for legal counsel. Id. 
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under these agencies’ supervision, many of which have their own in-house 
counsel or part-time, private counsel on retainer.43 
In South Carolina, executive control over state agencies came much 
later,44 and the legislature has continued to “jealously guard[]”45 its 
authority over some executive agencies.  The first significant restructuring 
of state government occurred in 1993, with the replacement of seventy-five 
state agencies run by boards and commissions with seventeen new 
executive agencies under increased gubernatorial control.46  Reported as 
“the most sweeping change in government”47 since the adoption of the state 
constitution in 1895, the 1993 Act nevertheless left in place significant 
legislative control over the Budget and Control Board, the Department of 
Transportation, and twenty-nine other agencies and commissions.48  
Another significant reorganization occurred in 2014, with the creation of a 
new cabinet agency, the Department of Administration, to replace the 
Budget and Control Board49 and the consolidation of numerous other 
boards and commissions under the Department of Administration’s 
authority.50  The 2014 legislation also expanded the requirements for 
legislative review of state agencies.51 
 
 43. See NORTH CAROLINA BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS (2007, rev. 
2015) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 44. See Page, supra note 31, at 12A (noting that most other states restructured their 
governments fifteen to thirty years earlier). 
 45. Cindi Ross Scoppe, S.C.’s Overhaul Completed Legislature Hands Over Key Powers 
to Governor, STATE, June 15, 1993, at 1A (referring to the 1993 Act) (“Legislators jealously 
guarded their control over road construction and severely limited the governor’s power over 
law enforcement and environmental regulations.  At no time did they seriously consider 
giving the chief executive any authority over education—the work of half the government.”). 
 46. State Government Restructuring Act of 1993, 1993 S.C. Acts 181.  The 1993 Act 
authorized the governor to hire and fire the directors of eleven agencies and to hire the 
directors of two other agencies for fixed terms.  The law also, for the first time, authorized 
the governor to remove “for any reason” board members in charge of most other agencies. 
See Cindi Ross Scoppe, ‘It’s History’:  Campbell Signs Bill to Overhaul Government, 
STATE, June 19, 1993, at 14A (“Under a blazing midmorning sun on the State House steps, 
Gov. Carroll Campbell signed legislation turning a third of the government over to himself 
and his successors.”). 
 47. Scoppe, supra note 46. 
 48. State Government Restructuring Act of 1993, 1993 S.C. Acts 181; see also Scoppe, 
supra note 45 (reporting that the restructuring “falls short of what the governor and his allies 
desired”). 
 49. South Carolina Restructuring Act of 2014, 2014 S.C. Acts 121.  Two of the Budget 
and Control Board’s functions were transferred to the State Fiscal Accountability 
Authority—the issuance of bonds, and the issuance of grants and loans—but the remainder 
devolved to the Department of Administration. Id. § 2(A)(1)–(2). 
 50. See generally South Carolina Restructuring Act of 2014, 2014 S.C. Acts 121. 
 51. Id. § 2-2-20(A) (“Beginning January 1, 2015, each standing committee shall conduct 
oversight studies and investigations on all agencies within the standing committee’s subject 
matter jurisdiction at least once every seven years in accordance with a schedule adopted as 
provided in this chapter.”); see also Cindi Ross Scoppe, Budget and Control Board 
Abolished, Now Comes the Hard Part for Legislators, STATE (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.thestate.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/cindi-ross-scoppe/article13837355. 
html (“The new law requires House and Senate committees to review every state agency at 
least once every seven years, [and] gives lawmakers new tools—chiefly subpoena power—to 
conduct those reviews . . . .  Although many legislators found the idea of empowering the 
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Effective July 1, 2015, there are twenty-three executive agencies in South 
Carolina.52  Sixteen are cabinet agencies, whose directors are appointed by 
the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.53  The Department 
of Transportation also is considered a cabinet agency,54 but remains under 
joint legislative control.55  In addition, there are two agencies whose chief 
executives are popularly elected56 and four independent agencies whose 
directors are appointed by a commission or board.57  All but two executive 
agencies have in-house general counsel, and most employ more than one 
lawyer.58  There are also hundreds of smaller executive boards and 
commissions,59 many of which have their own in-house counsel or part-
time, outside counsel.60 
B.  Move to In-House Agency Counseling 
In both states, the agency counseling function began within the Attorney 
General’s office with the formal or informal assignment of lawyers to 
particular agencies.  Over time and piecemeal, many larger agencies 
established in-house legal positions to handle recurring agency work, 
including certain types of litigation. 
In South Carolina, this process was relatively linear and consistent with a 
rationalization narrative (albeit a very gradual one).  In the late 1970s, the 
 
governor less objectionable when it was paired with more oversight tools for themselves, 
many failed to understand that exercising that power would require a great deal of work.”) 
[http://perma.cc/PWX7-7NBS]. 
 52. See infra APPENDIX B. 
 53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-30-10 (2015); South Carolina Restructuring Act of 2014, 2014 
S.C. Acts 121. 
 54. See Cabinet Agencies, SC OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.sc.gov/ 
Pages/Cabinet.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (listing cabinet agencies) [http://perma.cc 
/44QQ-4CBT]. 
 55. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is jointly governed by a seven-member 
legislative commission and a Secretary of Transportation appointed by the Governor. S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 1-30-10 (B)((1)(iv) (2015).  More than one interviewee referred to the DOT as 
a “two headed monster.” See Interview with Agency Lawyer 6 (2015) [hereinafter I6] 
(transcript on file with authors); Interview with Agency Lawyer 7 (2015) (transcript on file 
with authors). 
 56. The State Commissioner of Agriculture and State Superintendent of Education are 
popularly elected. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-30-10 (B)(1)(iii); see also S.C. CONST. Art. XI, 
§ 2. 
 57. The independent agencies are the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs, the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control, the Department of Mental Health, and the 
Department of Natural Resources.  Their governing commissions or boards, in turn, are 
made up of representatives from each of seven congressional districts, appointed by either 
the Governor or the legislature, plus one at-large member appointed by the Governor. SOUTH 
CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 480, 501, 532, 537–38, http://www.scstatehouse.gov/ 
man14/49_StGov.pdf [http://perma.cc/S39K-P9MJ]. 
 58. List of State Agency Attorneys in South Carolina (Aug. 20, 2015) (on file with 
authors); see also infra APPENDIX B. 
 59. Boards and Commissions, S.C. OFF. GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.sc.gov/ 
ExecutiveOffice/Pages/BoardsandCommissions.aspx (listing over 250 executive boards and 
commissions) [https://perma.cc/G3FB-G4K4]. 
 60. List of State Agency Attorneys in South Carolina, supra note 58. 
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Attorney General’s office did most of the legal work of state agencies;61 
however, several agencies had their “own”62 lawyers, such as the Tax 
Commission, the Wildlife Commission, the Department of Health and 
Environmental Control, the Department of Mental Health, and the 
Department of Mental Retardation (as they were then called).63  These 
lawyers were formally employed by the Attorney General’s office and 
called “assistant attorneys general,”64 but were, in fact, seconded to the 
agencies and worked out of the agencies’ offices.65 
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Attorney General sought funding to 
move various lawyers and groups of lawyers to the agencies’ payrolls.66  
The first “big” movement of lawyers to the agencies was the movement of 
“all the condemnation lawyers” (those handling condemnation proceedings 
for the state) to the Department of Transportation under Attorney General 
Travis Medlock in 1983.67  Medlock also moved “at least six” child support 
lawyers to the Department of Social Services, according to the memory of 
one long-time state official.68  He attributes these moves to the demands of 
specialized agency business and the comparatively limited resources of the 
Attorney General’s office.  As he stated: 
[I]t’s a gradual evolution toward the agency because of specialization.  
Because assistant attorneys general, while we can do litigation for the 
agency, the day-to-day representation has evolved more toward their own 
in-house counsel . . . .  [T]he Attorney General’s office just doesn’t have 
the resources on a day-to-day basis to advise big agencies [on their 
specific concerns].69 
The growth of in-house counsel positions continued throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, although they are somewhat difficult to track.  The Attorney 
General’s authority over executive agencies’ hiring of attorneys70 and 
engagement of attorneys on a fee basis71 was codified in 2009, but 
 
 61. Interview with Agency Lawyer 11, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter I11] (transcript on file 
with authors). 
 62. Interview with Agency Lawyer 12, at 2 (2015) [hereinafter I12] (transcript on file 
with authors). 
 63. Id. at 2–5. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. I11, supra note 61, at 2. 
 66. These early moves were not codified but rather affected through the Attorney 
General’s budget provisos. I12, supra note 62, at 1. 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. Id. 
 70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-160 (2009) (“A department or agency of state government 
may not hire a classified or temporary attorney as an employee except upon the written 
approval of the Attorney General and at compensation approved by him.  All of these 
attorneys at all times are under the supervision and control of the Attorney General except as 
otherwise provided by law unless prior approval by the State Budget and Control Board is 
obtained.  This section does not apply to an attorney hired by the General Assembly or the 
Judicial department.”). 
 71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-170(A) (“A department or agency of state government may 
not engage on a fee basis an attorney at law except upon the written approval of the Attorney 
General and upon a fee as must be approved by him.”). 
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authorization for specific positions—to the extent that they are codified—
are buried within each agency’s enabling legislation72 or in budget 
provisos.73  In general, however, the evolution of the agency counseling 
function in South Carolina appears primarily to reflect the expansion and 
rationalization of the executive function. 
In North Carolina, the process has been far less linear.  Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, individual agencies created an increasing number of 
“agency legal specialist” positions to provide “in-house” expertise and 
advice.74  The agencies did so on their own accord and without formal 
authorization from the Attorney General; at least some of these positions 
were funded through federal grants to the agencies.75  By 1987, there were 
“almost as many legal positions outside of the direct control of the 
[A]ttorney [G]eneral as there were within his control,”76 and only two state 
agencies—the Department of Cultural Resources and the Department of 
Labor—relied exclusively on the legal services of the Attorney General’s 
office. 
In 1988, recognizing the inefficiency of this arrangement, the General 
Assembly requested that the Attorney General prepare “a plan for the 
consolidation of legal services provided to the various departments and 
agencies of State government.”77  Through greater appropriations to the 
Attorney General’s office, many agency legal specialist positions were 
subsequently moved out of the agencies and centralized within the 
budgetary and hierarchical control of the Attorney General’s office.78 
The resulting arrangement may have achieved its stated goal of 
facilitating “a more consistent application of legal policy,”79 but it also 
 
 72. See, e.g., Marine Resources Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-5-50 (1976) (entitled 
“Prosecutions for violations of chapter” and codifying the authority of the Department of 
Natural Resources to employ special counsel). 
The department may prosecute for violations of this chapter for the collection of 
revenues due this State from the fishing industries and permitting of bottoms and 
waters and may employ counsel having special knowledge of the fisheries laws, 
fisheries, and coastal conditions to conduct the prosecutions in the inferior courts 
and assist the solicitor in the circuit courts and appellate courts. 
Id. 
 73. See I12, supra note 62, at 5; Interview with Agency Lawyer 17, at 3 (2015) 
[hereinafter I17] (transcript on file with authors). 
 74. ATT’Y GEN’S STAFF, REPORT TO THE 1989 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
(1989). 
 75. Interview with Agency Lawyer 8, at 5 (2015) [hereinafter I8] (transcript on file with 
authors); see also Page, supra note 31, at 12A (quoting political science professor Donald 
Fowler) (“Governors of the 1960s and early 1970s got a stronger grip on power when 
spending programs in President Johnson’s Great Society funneled millions of federal dollars 
through their offices.  ‘The institutional structure in terms of organization did not change, but 
the governors had power because of that money.’”). 
 76. ATT’Y GEN’S STAFF, supra note 74. 
 77. The Honorable Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State’s Law Firm:  The Powers, 
Duties and Operations of the Office of the Attorney General, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343, 367 
(1990) (quoting S.B. 26, 1989 Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1989)). 
 78. Interview with Agency Lawyer 3, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter I3] (transcript on file with 
authors). 
 79. Thornburg, supra note 77, at 367. 
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opened the door to political tension.  As then-Attorney General Lacy 
Thornburg described, when the Attorney General and the agency directors 
are from different political parties, the Attorney General’s duty to represent 
all state officers and agencies can “provide[] for a tenuous relationship with 
the agency-client.”80  Since that time, there has been a consistent “creep” of 
legal specialist positions back to the agencies81 and a gradual formalization 
of the in-house general counsel position.  By the early 2000s, all executive 
agencies had created in-house general counsel positions, and some had 
acquired large general counsel staffs.82 
C.  Functional Division Between 
Agency Counsel and the Attorney General 
The core function of the agency general counsel is to advise the agency.83  
“The agency counsel is indeed a counselor, not a litigator.”84  Embedded 
within their clients, agency general counsel develop specialized expertise 
and institutional knowledge, which they use in advising on law, process, 
and policy.  The litigation function remains with the Attorney General, 
who, in both states, is statutorily empowered to litigate on behalf of all state 
entities.85 
Naturally, there is some overlap between the two functions.  In both 
states, specialized carve-outs grant some agencies and commissions 
authority to litigate some types of matters on their own behalf.86  Agency 
general counsel also routinely collaborate with the lawyers at the Attorney 
General’s office who represent them in court.87  In addition, some agency 
litigation is handled by private counsel rather than by the Attorney 
General’s office.88  In South Carolina, tort claims against the agencies are 
covered by the Insurance Research Fund, which appoints outside counsel.89  
Both states also outsource litigation when an agency “need[s] help in very 
specialized area of the law or ha[s] a short term spike in legal needs like 
 
 80. Id. at 358. 
 81. I3, supra note 78, at 1, 2. 
 82. Interview with Agency Lawyer 13, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter I13] (transcript on file 
with authors); see also infra APPENDIX A. 
 83. Herz, supra note 2, at 148. 
 84. Id. at 143. 
 85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2(2) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-40 (2009). 
 86. See NORTH CAROLINA BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, supra 
note 43 (list of boards and commissions, noting those authorized to employ private counsel); 
OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED TO PROSECUTE CASES ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA (2015) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (list of agency carve-outs 
in South Carolina by agency and type of approval). 
 87. See I13, supra note 82, at 1 (describing close working relationships); I8, supra note 
75, at 10–11; see also Herz, supra note 2, at 149 (“Although [agency general counsel] 
generally do not have the lead role in litigation . . . they do participate.”). 
 88. See Lemos, supra note 10 (discussing the privatization of government litigation). 
 89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-11-140 (2015) (authorizing the Insurance Reserve Fund to 
provide tort liability insurance to governmental entities). See generally INSURANCE RESERVE 
FUND, http://www.irf.sc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BC8F-ENXE]. 
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from a large scale lawsuit.”90  Although, in both states, the retention of 
outside counsel requires approval by the Attorney General,91 in practice, 
agency counsel may have significant influence over the selection of 
attorneys.92 
Agency general counsel also seek advice and opinions from the Attorney 
General’s office independent of litigation.  As one respondent explained:  
“Because of the nature of agency work, there are internal pressures to get 
stuff done, which can interfere with clear-eyed legal advice.”93  Moreover, 
even when the path ahead is clear, “it can be useful to have advice coming 
from a third party who is not in the office; you can blame them when you 
explain to someone more powerful why you are not doing something they 
want you to do.”94  As another respondent observed: 
[A]lmost nobody in private practice ever reads an AG opinion, but I 
couldn’t get by without them in my job now . . . not because I don’t know 
what the good, what the right call is, but because I have no authority on 
which to show someone:  this is why I am telling you what I am telling 
you and look, this other AG opinion says it too . . . .  [T]hey are frankly 
cover sometimes for, you know, “why did you do this?”  Well because 
this AG opinion says we can.95 
The relationship between agency general counsel and the Attorney 
General’s office may be strained by partisan differences, however.  In North 
Carolina, the frequency of agency counsel seeking guidance from the 
Attorney General has declined since the election of a Republican Governor 
and a Republican-dominated General Assembly.96  According to one 
respondent: 
I think that the general sense is that because the [Attorney General’s] 
office has been a Democratic office for so, so long . . . the Republican 
legislature, they’re uneasy with the idea that the AG’s office would be 
handling the defenses to these things that perhaps politically the 
individual AG might not be aligned with . . . [such as] the gay marriage 
deal [and the controversy over voter] photo ID.97 
 
 90. Interview with Agency Lawyer 5, at 4 (2015) [hereinafter I5] (transcript on file with 
authors); see also I8, supra note 75, at 12. 
 91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-170 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(a) (2011) (“No 
department, officer, agency, institution, commission, bureau or other organized activity of 
the State which receives support in whole or in part from the State shall employ any counsel, 
except with the approval of the Governor.  The Governor shall give his approval only if the 
Attorney General has advised [the Governor] that it is impracticable for the Attorney 
General to render the legal services.”). But see Martin v. Thornburg, 359 S.E.2d 472, 480 
(N.C. 1987) (allowing the Governor to employ private counsel as he or she “may deem 
proper or necessary” without the attorney general’s approval). 
 92. See I2, supra note 1, at 13; I6, supra note 55, at 7; I17, supra note 73, at 12. 
 93. I5, supra note 90, at 4. 
 94. Id.; see also I2, supra note 1, at 12; I8, supra note 75, at 6, 10. 
 95. Interview with Agency Lawyer 19, at 14–15 (2015) [hereinafter I19] (transcript on 
file with authors). 
 96. I13, supra note 82, at 1. 
 97. Interview with Agency Lawyer 14, at 2 (2015) [hereinafter I14] (transcript on file 
with authors). 
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In 2014, the General Assembly amended the law regarding retention of 
private counsel.98  Although not clear on its face, one respondent explained 
that its widely understood intent was to allow the General Assembly and the 
Governor to “cut the AG out of the process”: 
The legislature didn’t trust the AG’s office to mount an adequate defense, 
and so they ultimately changed the law so they no longer have to seek the 
same type of approval if they want to hire a private counsel [and] they 
hired a whole cadre of lawyers, [and] the Governor’s office hired a 
smaller group of lawyers . . . .  [T]he motivation [was] to cut the AG out 
of the process and allow themselves the liberty to buy peace of mind by 
buying private counsel.99 
Thus far, partisan tensions have not trickled down to affect retention of 
private counsel by agencies, but some agency general counsel noted it as a 
possibility.100  We return to this issue in our discussion of research 
questions below. 
II.  THE ROLE OF AGENCY GENERAL COUNSEL 
The most striking feature of the day-to-day role of agency general 
counsel is the extent to which it varies—by agency, by director, and by the 
professional orientation of the lawyer in the position.  Although agency 
general counsel encounter some similar substantive issues—most notably 
human resource and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) issues—the scope 
and substance of their day-to-day work depends significantly on the 
functions of the agency, the expectations of the agency director, and the 
institutional culture of the office.  Respondents were unanimous in 
emphasizing this variation.  As one said following a roundtable discussion, 
“[N]one of us seems to do the same job.”101 
Respondents also emphasized their professional autonomy and lack of 
accountability.  Several agency general counsel whom we interviewed were 
the first to hold the position and, as one said, “I was making it up as I went 
along.”102  Even those in established positions report that “there is a lot of 
winging it”103 and that the contours of the job depend on “one’s own 
philosophy and experience.”104  As one respondent explained:  “You kind 
of get this confidence of just being like, ‘we’re going with this, let’s go with 
that,’ and honestly?  Nine times out of ten, there are going to be no 
 
 98. Transparency in Private Attorney Contracts Act (TIPAC), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 114-
9.2 to -9.8, -2.3(b) (2014).  The statute requires a written determination that retention of 
private counsel is “both cost-effective and in the public interest.” Id. § 114-9.4. 
 99. I14, supra note 97, at 2. 
 100. I13, supra note 82, at 1. 
 101. Interview with Agency Lawyer 1, at 13 (2015) [hereinafter I1] (transcript on file 
with authors). 
 102. I5, supra note 90, at 2. 
 103. I2, supra note 1, at 6. 
 104. Interview with Agency Lawyer 9, at 14 (2015) [hereinafter I9] (transcript on file 
with authors). 
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consequences for your decision.”105  Meanwhile, respondents come to the 
job from a wide variety of backgrounds and bring a variety of professional 
orientations and dispositions to the role.  One might ask—we have asked 
ourselves—whether “agency counseling” is even a coherent topic. 
Yet it is precisely their professional autonomy and the implications of 
different approaches that make the role of agency general counsel both 
theoretically and normatively interesting.  Theoretically:  How do agency 
counsel perceive and respond to the autonomy in their roles?  What are the 
sources of—and constraints on—their authority?  To what extent are we 
observing, or should we expect to observe, the formation of specialized 
professional networks among agency general counsel or increasing 
standardization of their titles and functions?  Are there normative reasons 
for promoting a standardized approach to the agency counseling role?  This 
part begins to examine such questions and lays a foundation for further 
research. 
A.  Characteristics and Career Paths 
We first surveyed the public profiles of those currently serving as 
executive agency general counsel in the two states (n=39).106  Women make 
up 41 percent of current agency counsel:  39 percent (seven of eighteen) in 
North Carolina and 43 percent (nine of twenty-one) in South Carolina.  
Most agency counsel graduated from a law school within their own state:  
84 percent among those for whom we could find law school information.107  
About half began their legal careers in private practice (seventeen of thirty-
four, with information about five people missing), and about a third (eleven 
of thirty-four) were in private practice immediately prior to becoming 
agency general counsel or presumptive agency general counsel.108  Another 
third were promoted to the general counsel position from within the same 
agency, and a third came to the position from a different state agency or 
public sector job.109  The average age of agency general counsel is forty-
 
 105. I2, supra note 1, at 16. 
 106. See infra APPENDIX A, B. 
 107. In North Carolina, fifteen of seventeen attorneys (one missing) graduated from North 
Carolina law schools (University of North Carolina, Wake Forest, North Carolina Central, 
and Campbell).  The remaining two graduated from Wisconsin.  In South Carolina, 
seventeen of twenty-one graduated from the University of South Carolina School of Law.  
The remaining four graduated from Cincinnati, Georgetown, Tennessee, and Widener. 
 108. In North Carolina, eight of sixteen attorneys (two missing) began their careers in 
private practice, and five of sixteen were in private practice immediately prior to becoming 
agency general counsel.  In South Carolina, nine of eighteen (three missing) began their 
careers in private practice, and six of eighteen were in private practice immediately prior to 
becoming agency general counsel, interim general counsel, or, in one case, deputy general 
counsel with the expectation of promotion within the year. 
 109. In North Carolina, five of sixteen attorneys (two missing) were promoted to general 
counsel from within the same agency and six came from another agency.  In South Carolina, 
six of eighteen were promoted to general counsel from within the same agency (not counting 
the two hired as presumptive general counsel), and five came from another agency or public 
sector job. 
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seven, based on the date of their undergraduate degree,110 and the average 
tenure of those currently serving is about five years.111  In 2015, the 
average salary of agency general counsel was $103,211 in North Carolina 
and $107,051 in South Carolina.112 
B.  Attractions of the Position 
A common stereotype about government lawyers is that they do not work 
as hard as private practitioners and always have their eye on the clock.  One 
research assistant’s response to the question of why lawyers enter state 
government was:  “[T]hat’s a short study:  nine to five.”  Several 
respondents voiced a similar stereotype when comparing government 
lawyers to private practitioners.  As one said: 
Some government lawyers are just looking for the easiest way, the lazy 
way.  Don’t get me wrong—there are many unbelievably talented and 
inspiring lawyers in this line of work, but there are also those that 
couldn’t find a job elsewhere, or retreated to this from private practice 
because they thought they wouldn’t have to work as hard.  Those people 
really piss me off.  That is not why we come to work.113 
Another remarked that government lawyers “don’t buy new clothes” and 
are “not very social” compared to private practitioners.114  “[M]aybe they 
don’t want to fool with it and that’s why they got into state, they don’t seem 
as socially equipped.”115 
But although we encountered or heard about one or two agency general 
counsel who fit this description, it does not fit many of the lawyers in our 
sample.  This is not to say that the generally shorter and more predictable 
hours are not appealing, especially to parents—particularly parents whose 
spouses are in private practice.  As one respondent explained: 
[A] lot of lawyers seem to be married to lawyers.  One of you has the 
career that[] “hey, I can’t do this, I can’t pick up the kids, I’ve got to do 
this,” and someone else has to be more stable, and so even our deputy 
director, his wife works at [a large law firm], so even for him . . . we joke 
around that he’s one of us . . . .  [H]ere, you know, issues come up, but for 
the most part if you need to get your kids at five o’clock you can get your 
kids at five o’clock.116 
 
 110. When possible, age was verified directly using Martindale Hubbell, the White Pages, 
and state employee databases.  The average age of agency general counsel is forty-five in 
North Carolina and forty-nine in South Carolina. 
 111. The average tenure of those currently serving as agency general counsel is 4.5 years 
in North Carolina (sixteen of eighteen, with two missing) and five years in South Carolina 
(twenty of twenty-one, with one missing). 
 112. This accounts for the salaries of seventeen of eighteen agency counsel in North 
Carolina and nineteen of twenty-one in South Carolina. 
 113. I5, supra note 90, at 5. 
 114. I2, supra note 1, at 17. 
 115. Id. 
 116. I1, supra note 101, at 17; see also I2, supra note 1, at 16; I8, supra note 75, at 21; 
I17, supra note 73, at 2. 
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Several respondents also noted the mental relief of being off the clock at 
night and not having to bill hours or chase clients for business.  As one said: 
When I went home at night, except for what I would call a three-month 
crisis period, I didn’t think about the job . . . I mean I worked long hours 
but when I got in the car to drive home, I’d left it all at the office.  It’s 
hard to do that in private practice.117 
Another, explaining why he left private practice, said: 
[When] I looked at the people ahead of me, the partners and how they 
would spend their days, it became less about the practice of law and more 
about the business of law.  Lot of glad-handing, lot of rotary clubs, a lot 
of client development, a lot of chasing down clients to pay you, a lot of 
sort of editing and supervising what other attorneys were doing and not a 
lot of the fun stuff . . . .  [A]nd I hated billing hours . . . it’s like going 
through the day with wet socks on.  You never really forget that you have 
hours to bill no matter what else you are doing . . . .  I thought, you know, 
I’d rather be in an environment where the work, the substantive legal 
work is the focus and not all the peripheral things.118 
One respondent summed it up as follows: 
[I]n the private sector it is always about the money.  In the public sector, 
not so much.  It can be, but generally it is not about the money.119 
On the clock, most respondents seem highly committed to and engaged 
in their work and to find it extremely satisfying.  One respondent remarked:  
“I pinch myself on a regular basis.”120  For some respondents, professional 
satisfaction comes from a sense of vocation and identification with the 
agency’s goals.  As one respondent put it, “I love my client.” 
I love what this agency does, I believe in it, that was part of what I was 
lacking in [private practice].  I didn’t like my client, you know?  I mean, 
truly, I really didn’t . . . .  I love my client now.  I believe in what we do, I 
like what we do.  I wasn’t interested in going to just any state agency, it 
was this one in particular.121 
A number of respondents also talked more generally about the 
satisfaction of big-picture thinking, of “solving problems”122 and learning 
new things.  One respondent said:  “I’m not bored anymore, I’m learning 
new things all the time, I’m never dealing with the same subject twice, 
which was scary when I first came on.”123  Another said, “I’m forming new 
brain cells every day, and to be that excited . . . I just love to come to 
 
 117. I9, supra note 104, at 8; see also I2, supra note 1, at 19. 
 118. I19, supra note 95, at 2; see also I6, supra note 55, at 1; Interview with Agency 
Lawyer 18, at 27 (2015) [hereinafter I18] (transcript on file with authors). 
 119. I18, supra note 118, at 28. 
 120. I17, supra note 73, at 15. 
 121. I2, supra note 1, at 3. 
 122. I6, supra note 55, at 23. 
 123. I2, supra note 1, at 15. 
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work.”124  Another described it as a “macro” rather than “micro” approach 
to law: 
Litigation practice had felt like the micro application of law—everything 
was a discrete dispute between this person and that person on a relatively 
small issue.  It was satisfying, but then I got into government work where 
you had the macro application of law.  Issues and disputes were bigger 
and they impacted a far larger number of people . . . .  I mean, you had 
this group of people who understood their job but had very little 
perspective on how the law affected or circumscribed the ways in which 
they could do their job.  My job was not just to give legal advice but to 
give legal perspectives on what it would take to make the program 
successful and effective.  I was a counselor.  I had to think about what 
could go wrong and bring to their attention potential problems that they 
might not be thinking about.  What a rewarding experience.125 
Finally, several respondents said that they like the focus on getting it 
“right” and getting to “do the right thing.”  The following comments are 
illustrative: 
[O]ne of the good things about my job is I get to do the right thing.  And 
that is something you don’t always get to do as a lawyer, you have to sort 
of represent your client’s interests.126 
[O]ne of my favorite things . . . [about] being a government lawyer was, 
the objective was to get it right . . . .  [Y]ou can’t do that in private 
practice, and your objective is not to see, I don’t want to say how much 
you can bill in a case, but money is not an objective and that I guess from 
a legal standpoint, from a lawyer’s standpoint, was what I liked.  Because 
I did have good clients who did want to, just, get it right, and that 
happened over and over again.127 
In general, then, respondents paint a rosy picture of their positions, 
especially in comparison to private practice.  This finding comports with 
broader comparative research on lawyer satisfaction.128  As one respondent 
said: 
[When I started my career,] I probably had more of a negative thought 
[about government lawyers], and then the more, the older I got, I was like, 
“[w]ow, those people are really smart, because they’ve got a good job 
that’s challenging that’s not stressful.”  And it pays okay, you know, it’s 
not private practice, but it’s not that far from private practice that it’s 
 
 124. I17, supra note 73, at 28. 
 125. I5, supra note 90, at 2–3. 
 126. I1, supra note 101, at 21. 
 127. I8, supra note 75, at 7–8. 
 128. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD:  FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY 
OF LEGAL CAREERS 50 (2004) (finding that lawyers in government and other public sector 
jobs report higher levels of satisfaction with their job setting and the substance of their work 
than lawyers in private practice); RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II:  SECOND 
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 50 (2009) (same); Lawrence S. Krieger 
& Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?  A Data-Driven Prescription to 
Redefine Professional Success, 83 G.W. L. REV. 554 (2015) (finding that lawyers in public 
service are happier than lawyers in private practice). 
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worth the stress and anxiety that comes with that, and so then it was like, 
“[w]ow, how do I get into that?”  And, you know, people are very 
bright.129 
C.  Sources of Authority 
Respondents draw relatively little of their day-to-day authority from 
specialized legal knowledge.  Although the move to “in-house” agency 
counseling suggests increasing specialization of the legal function,130 most 
respondents describe themselves as generalists.  As one said:  “[T]he 
position was a real mix of work for me—intergovernmental work, lobbying 
economic interests, bringing a legal perspective to all sorts of things.  
Nothing was routine.”131  Another said: 
I’m just not doing as much actual practice of, traditional practice of law in 
that I have a case and I’m working on a case; it’s more just general 
advice.  It’s kind of what I think . . . [being] a lawyer in a small town 
might be like, you’re getting questions about anything and everything, 
personnel issues, trademark issues, regulations, criminal stuff, contract 
issues.  You’ve got to be a generalist.132 
Many respondents were not legal specialists in the areas most relevant to 
the agency’s work before they were hired, and several said that did not turn 
out to be as important as they had expected.  As one respondent explained: 
Any lawyer coming to be general counsel of [this agency] will have to 
learn thirty to forty percent of this job brand new on the job.  The only 
difference that I, or somebody else, will have is that for different lawyers 
with different experience levels, you’ll have to learn a different piece of 
it . . . .  But that makes sense when you think about [it] . . . .  [It is] like 
being general counsel of a medium-sized corporation and overlaying 
some politics and some state, some regulations that are unique to state 
government employees.133 
Instead, respondents draw much of their authority from general legal 
training—particularly their training to evaluate clients’ decisions and 
practices in terms of formal rules.  Consider the following comments about 
the importance of statutory and other formal language: 
People think you have to have a [particular] background [to work 
here] . . . but you don’t.  It’s really more you’ve got to understand how the 
law works and see it sometimes from the outside . . . .  [For instance] 
you’re looking at a statute and you’re like, “you write people under this 
statute for a criminal thing, but that’s not what it says,” you know?  Let’s 
look at it from how a judge or a jury would look at it, who know nothing 
about what you do.134 
 
 129. I2, supra note 1, at 17. 
 130. I12, supra note 62, at 5. 
 131. I5, supra note 90, at 2. 
 132. I2, supra note 1, at 16. 
 133. I9, supra note 104, at 9. 
 134. I2, supra note 1, at 17. 
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Usually what it is, is we get a sense of the statutes as a whole and kind of 
a structural way our chapter deals with certain types of problems, and then 
if we have an issue that arises that is not addressed by statute and it’s not 
addressed by some kind of AG’s opinion in the past, or by a directive 
from our executive director, which are also documented and filed, we’ll 
try to apply kind of the broader way that the statutes came to approach 
these particular problems . . . .135 
A significant part of the day-to-day work of agency general counsel is 
reactive.  As one respondent put it:  “[My] job description changes every 
day I walk into the office.”136  Much of what respondents do involves 
answering questions from the agency director, coworkers, or the public; and 
many are questions of first impression.  Several respondents reported that 
learning to respond to such questions with authority is an important skill of 
the job: 
We make it up as we go . . . and that is scary when you’re coming out of 
private practice, because a lot of stuff [in private practice] is kind of black 
and white, more black and white than it is here.  I mean, you start to look 
at stuff and you’ll be like, how has this never come up before in thirty 
years of this agency . . . ?  What do we do?  Let’s start with what we do, 
and then I go from there, and then I think, either that sounds crazy and we 
shouldn’t do it that way, or tell me why you do it that way.  You know, a 
lot of people know the law well, way more than I do, because . . . we 
touch a lot of different things.137 
[N]ew questions were constantly arising and the statutes are never 
specific enough to answer every question.  So, you know, you’re 
formulating . . . .  And the quantum of things that we don’t have a definite 
answer on is so large compared to the very small subset that we actually 
know for certain under the law.138 
I am not sure what juncture as an attorney, when somebody asks you a 
question you don’t really have to struggle with what the right answer 
is . . . .  Not just because you know a lot about your agency, but because 
you have had experiences before that prepared you to deal with situations 
that you know, you never thought you would encounter.  It’s very 
satisfying.139 
Other aspects of the job are proactive:  for instance, keeping up with rule 
changes, reviewing existing agency policies, and bringing customary 
agency practices in line with statutory and regulatory language.  As one 
respondent explained:  “[T]here is an essence of common law in these state 
agencies that is, ‘This is how we’ve always done it.’  And the courts defer 
 
 135. I14, supra note 97, at 12. 
 136. Interview with Agency Lawyer 15, at 6 (2015) [hereinafter I15] (transcript on file 
with authors). 
 137. I2, supra note 1, at 6. 
 138. I14, supra note 97, at 10. 
 139. I19, supra note 95, at 19–20. 
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to that in some ways . . . .  [But] if that conflicts with the statute obviously 
that’s a problem.”140  Another respondent reported: 
I am reviewing [our policies] for clarity; I am reviewing them to make 
sure that they are legally accurate . . . .  For instance, if the FOIA policy 
says that you cannot release anything under FOIA if it’s embarrassing—
well, that is not the standard.  That is absolutely not the standard, so that 
goes . . . .  [Or] if something is quoted—a statute, for instance—inside of 
a policy, I want to make sure that it’s the correct statute, or if they cite a 
series of three and it’s actually supposed to be a series of four or five, I’ll 
add the fourth and fifth statute.141 
Thus, much of what agency counsel do can be described as legal process 
improvement—or the rationalization of the agency function142—based on 
general legal training.  As one respondent described it:  “It’s legal, but it’s 
also a lot of streamlining and running, helping to run the agency and 
coming up with ideas on how to make things better.”143 
Most respondents seem relatively insulated from both hierarchical and 
political pressure.  Despite sitting at the “confluence of conflicting 
pressures,” as Herz has described them,144 the agency general counsel in 
our sample report surprisingly little conflict in their roles.  Most 
respondents are either personal friends with, or happily independent of, the 
agency director.  If anything, it is agency directors who seem dependent on 
agency counsel.  As one respondent observed, “[T]he [general counsel] 
almost always knows more [than the director] because they don’t turn over 
as often.”145  Consider the following examples: 
[T]he person that became the [agency director] was a personal 
friend . . . .  [S]o mine was not a political appointment by any means; it 
was more of, come in and help him get his legal department 
established.146 
As I was debating [how long to stay in this job], I knew [X] was going to 
be our next director and she came to me and said, “Will you stay, you 
know, I feel like I need you”. . . .  I said that I would, and so she, I liked 
her before, but as she’s worked up here I’ve gotten to know her more and 
she’s become a good friend . . . .147 
I pretty much completely define my own job . . . .  I truly have enough 
work and stuff to do without trailing [the agency director] around all day.  
And I can see that would overtake my entire life if I were doing that.  I 
like being independent.  I let him know what I feel like he needs to 
know . . . .  I really see my role, this is going to sound weird, as the 
counselor to the mafia boss, you know, I don’t bother him unless I need 
 
 140. I2, supra note 1, at 5. 
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 142. See supra note 24. 
 143. I1, supra note 101, at 6. 
 144. See Herz, supra note 2, at 143. 
 145. I18, supra note 118, at 22. 
 146. I9, supra note 104, at 1. 
 147. I1, supra note 101, at 15. 
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to.  My job is to make his job easier, my job is to keep things off, to keep 
things from coming to him.148 
Likewise, most respondents draw a clear boundary between their role as 
advisor and the agency director’s role—and accountability—as decision 
maker.  As one said:  “I don’t give orders, I give advice.  You are free to 
accept or reject everything I am telling you.”149  Two others explained: 
I counsel them, but I really don’t ever make a final decision, and I don’t 
feel that’s my role, and maybe I’m wrong on that, but that’s how I’ve 
gone into it, so, the buck doesn’t stop with me, it’s going to stop with the 
director.150 
[The agency director and I do not] have disagreements because I’m her 
lawyer, I’m the lawyer for the agency.  So I say to the director on 
particular issues, “This is the pro, this is the con, this is your decision” 
and let her make that decision.151 
For some, this lack of accountability is an appeal of the job.  One 
respondent said, “I don’t stay up at night worrying I’m going to lose my law 
license anymore.”152 
This is not to suggest that there is never pressure to support an expedient 
decision or to provide cover for the director’s desired course of action.  As 
one respondent said: 
It’s not unusual in government, at every level, for clients to want to say, 
“The lawyer said I could do it.”  And many of them really don’t care if 
it’s legal or not, “if the lawyer said I could do it, I’ve got cover.”  That 
really shouldn’t be the lawyer’s job, but uninformed or, people who don’t 
have much of a backbone, will do that.153 
Another said: 
Sure, I disagree with [my bosses] every now and then, but . . . if they want 
something done, I’m here to try to get it done for them, that’s the bottom 
line.  And I can smile and laugh and say, “Well I think you’re wrong, but 
I’ll do what I can for you.”154 
Further, while most respondents draw a clear boundary between advising 
and decision making, the scope of agency counsel’s authority and 
accountability for decisions may expand significantly during a crisis, as the 
following comment suggests: 
[It was] absolutely fascinating to be dropped into [a controversial case on 
the first day of the job].  And then all the other stuff, because they hadn’t 
had an attorney on staff for three months . . . .  [The director] was just so 
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appreciative of having someone . . . who came to work every day and 
wasn’t crazy and had a good work ethic and was prepared to do—and I 
did do—anything, I was like the vice principal of a school.  You don’t 
want to do it?  I’ll do it.  You hate this report, I’ll do it, it’s got to be done, 
I’ll do it.  So I took on a tremendous number of duties that fall outside 
[the role of] general counsel . . . .155 
Even during crisis periods, however, none of our respondents reported 
significant hierarchical or political conflict.  Instead, they discussed “crises” 
primarily in terms of workload:  long hours, fast pace, and all hands on 
deck.  The following comments are illustrative: 
All I know is that I didn’t have the luxury of thinking of myself as 
occupying a narrow legal position such that I should stay in my office 
until asked a question and then retreat to my office after each issue was 
resolved.  The agency had issues and problems to address and we were all 
on the ground helping.156 
I was in meetings anywhere from six to eight or eight-and-a-half hours a 
day and probably . . . 80 percent of the time I was making decisions and 
moving on, . . . 20 percent of the time I was listening, gathering 
information, and would then meet with the director and anybody else that 
he or I, either individually or collectively, thought should be in 
attendance . . . .  I think because of my unique situation and experience he 
delegated a lot more to me than most general counsels.  I probably briefed 
him, if I took 20 percent of the decisions and issues to him, I probably 
briefed him on 30 percent that I made that I wanted him to know 
about . . . .  I don’t remember us ever disagreeing on a legal issue.157 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What, then, to make of our sunny sample?  Our account has emphasized 
the attractions and satisfactions of the agency general counsel position, with 
little emphasis on—or evidence of—personal, professional, or political 
conflict.  This account, however, is based on a small sample from only two 
states, and it focuses primarily on the commonalities of agency counsels’ 
day-to-day work versus the dynamics of particular agencies or events.  This 
part discusses the limits of our account and identifies questions for future 
research. 
A.  Limits of the Sample 
One question is whether our sample is representative of those currently 
serving as agency general counsel in our states.  Although respondents’ 
generally high levels of satisfaction and engagement are consistent with 
previous research on government lawyers, as noted above,158 several 
respondents suggested that the position of agency general counsel is suited 
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to a limited tenure and that some people stay in it too long based on state 
retirement incentives.  For instance, one respondent spoke critically of 
“lifers staring out the window waiting to hit that twenty-eighth year, 
playing solitaire.”159  Another respondent previously served as general 
counsel in a different agency but left in part due to boredom.  As she said: 
[After fifteen years] I could do that job in my sleep . . .  I started getting 
antsy . . . .  [It] was a great job, wonderful people, [X] is one of the best 
bosses I’ve ever had in my life, but I was phoning it in.  Absolutely 
phoning it in.160 
Agency general counsel with longer tenures also may encounter more 
political conflict or grow increasingly frustrated with the political process.  
As one respondent remarked: 
I will not retire in this job . . .  I’m close enough to the throne now that I 
realize how political a lot of things get . . . .  We get requests from 
politicians about any number of things.  Honestly, it’s a lot of time that’s 
wasted feeding that beast, that frankly does not advance—it advances the 
agency and the agency’s mission in the sense that it doesn’t get us 
enemies in the state house who are going to slash our funding.  
But . . . it’s not going to help me review this contract any faster because I 
have to drop everything and answer some stupid question about some bill 
that I know will never pass in the first place.  What do you think of this 
bill?  I think it’s a stupid idea and I think it’s going to fail, and I think you 
are wasting my time . . . .161 
We made no effort to control for length of tenure (or any other variable) 
in our interview sample.  Ours is a “snowball” (or “reputational”) 
sample,162 in which we asked the agency counsel we know to recommend 
participants for the study; then asked those participants for more names, and 
so on, until we felt we had enough data to present interesting preliminary 
findings.163  The resulting sample underrepresents those with longer tenures 
in the position.  Only two of the eleven respondents currently serving as 
agency general counsel have been in the position for more than five years, 
compared to eleven of thirty-six agency general counsel currently serving in 
the two states (three are missing). 
In addition, we have relatively little information about what agency 
general counsel do after they leave their positions, and we did not interview 
lawyers working a rung below agency counsel (such as deputy general 
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2062 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
counsel or staff counsel), who may have differing perspectives on the 
agency counseling role and who may aspire to become agency general 
counsel.  Both would make interesting questions for future research on 
agency counsel characteristics and careers. 
B.  Evolution of the In-House Counseling Function 
Another set of questions relates to the evolution of the in-house 
counseling function in state agencies.  In private organizations, such as 
corporations and law firms, in-house lawyers have, over time, become more 
organized, more professionally specialized, and more powerful relative to 
organizational executives and outside lawyers.  For instance, corporate in-
house counsel—originally called “kept” counsel164—now have a 35,000-
plus member professional association165 and typically control the 
procurement and supervision of outside counsel.166  Corporate in-house 
counsel are also subject to specialized ethics rules167 and attorney-client 
privilege analysis.168  Likewise, in large law firms, the role of in-house 
counsel evolved from a part-time, informal role played by a practicing 
partner into a structurally independent, full-time position,169 with 
specialized professional networks170 and specialized privilege case law.171 
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Most commentators attribute the expansion of in-house counseling in the 
private sector to the growth and consolidation of client organizations and 
the increasing complexity of their regulatory environments.172  Research on 
corporations, in particular, emphasizes the economic incentives that drive 
the allocation of legal work to inside versus outside counsel.173  It is not 
clear whether the same forces apply to state agencies, which do not control 
their own budgets—or, for that matter, to other public and nonprofit 
employers.  Research on the use of private lawyers for government 
litigation questions the economic efficiency of government make-or-buy 
decisions, which may be more likely to be driven by short-term budget 
concerns.174 
That said, the evolution of in-house agency counseling in our states 
closely resembles the early development of in-house counseling in 
corporations and law firms, which points to the possibility of continued 
expansion and professional organization of the agency counsel role.  For 
instance, we already see the emergence of nascent professional networks 
among agency general counsel in both states.  Respondents report that 
“within North Carolina, they do have a little general counsel group” 
although “it’s not like the first Tuesday of the month, it’s kind of a random 
thing.”175  The group is in the preliminary stages of drafting an agency 
general counsel handbook of generally applicable policies and frequently 
referenced information.  In South Carolina, likewise, agency counsel 
recently have initiated periodic roundtables, reviving a practice that was 
established, then faltered, a number of years ago.  A few respondents also 
participate in listservs, events, and networks geared toward their specific 
agencies. 
The development of organized professional networks among state agency 
general counsel could promote the rationalization of agency policy and 
practice (“best practices”) by facilitating information sharing among 
agencies.176  For instance, several respondents reported asking general 
counsel in other agencies for policy language on common issues—a 
practice that likely motivated the goal of drafting a manual in North 
Carolina.  As one said, “We were trying to develop a workplace violence 
policy so I sent an email to [the] group and said, ‘Do any of you have a 
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2064 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
workplace violence policy?’”177  A few respondents also make efforts to 
proactively share information with other agency counsel, although they 
report that this practice is rare.  One said: 
I’m probably one of the more social ones . . . .  [F]or example a case came 
out yesterday, and I emailed it out to a bunch of them and was like, “Hey 
there’s this new case on FOIA, if you’re interested.”  They don’t ever do 
that to me . . . [although] they always write back and say “thanks for 
sharing it.”  But I would think that’s something we should all be doing.178 
The development of organized networks among agency general counsel 
could also promote the development of shared professional norms and 
enhance agency counsels’ authority.  Law firm general counsel report 
benefitting from opportunities to discuss common issues and challenges 
with their peers at other firms.179  Firm counsel also report that appeals to 
community standards—that is, “how other firms do it”—help them to lead 
partners “to the right answer” on contested issues.180  Interagency networks 
may be especially important given the absence of institutional memory in 
many state agencies.  As one respondent said, “One of the real flaws in 
government . . . is a profound failure of knowledge transfer, and in large 
measure it’s due to high turnover.”181  Another said, “It’s like being an 
archeologist . . . there’s zero history.”182 
Whether to expect the further development of organized networks among 
agency general counsel remains an open question, however.  As discussed 
above, the structure and culture of state agencies vary enormously, as does 
the substantive work of agency general counsel.  Agency general counsel 
may have less in common than corporate or law firm general counsel and 
fewer incentives to make the effort to network with lawyers from other 
agencies or states.183  As one respondent reported: 
[W]e do have national conferences and so forth but . . . that’s not my bag.  
I’m just a little worker bee . . . .  [Y]ou get into those big organizations 
and then they want you to plan the next conference and plan the panel 
discussion, and organize the next.  I don’t have time to do that.  I’ve got 
all I can say grace over here.184 
Likewise, most respondents view bar associations as unresponsive to the 
interests of government lawyers, and public employers do not pay bar dues.  
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Thus, most respondents do not  participate in bar-sponsored networks and 
events.  The following comment is typical: 
As a government lawyer, I always felt excluded, I guess.  The bar 
association[s] want you to join and it costs money . . . .  There are a few 
people in state government who pay the money to join the bar association 
or to join the different groups, but I think for the most part people just 
don’t join.  Because the bar association[s] . . . [are] not focused on 
government lawyers to begin with.185 
Thus, the professional development of agency counsel and the viability 
of interagency networks are important questions for future research.  
Comparative research in other states could help to extend our analysis.  
Future research should also investigate the relative importance of 
significant events—such as legal and political contests, or environmental 
crises—versus general bureaucratic expansion in the evolution of agency 
counseling.  Most existing research on agency counseling is based on case 
studies of conflicts or crises involving individual agencies.186  Within legal 
scholarship, the primary question has been:  Who is the client in cases of 
conflict?187  Our account, by contrast, has focused on the commonalities of 
agency general counsels’ day-to-day work.  Comparing the developments 
that grow out of conflicts and crises versus day-to-day work could inform 
both legal scholarship and agency practice. 
C.  Implications of Partisan and Institutional Politics 
A final set of questions relates to the role of partisan and institutional 
politics.  Above, we noted the apparent role of North Carolina politics in 
locating and shaping the agency counseling function.  Respondents 
observed that when, as is currently the case, the Governor and Attorney 
General are from different political parties, executive agencies may work to 
distance themselves from the Attorney General’s office, either by formally 
moving more lawyers in-house or by outsourcing work to private counsel.  
But while respondents who commented on this were speaking of partisan 
politics, institutional politics—the inevitable and continuous jockeying for 
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power over resources and decision making—may play an equally 
significant role.  Consider the following comments: 
I want to get out from under the thumb of the legislature, and you can’t 
work at a state agency and not have to pay attention to what those clowns 
are up to . . . .188 
I got on the wrong side of the General Assembly . . . .  You guys sit over 
here in this ivory tower of the state house, and you dictate from on high, 
you don’t want to know how it’s going to impact nine-tenths of the people 
you’re about to pass this legislation for because you’ve got one person 
you’re thinking about:  yourself.189 
Often, it is difficult to disentangle partisan and institutional politics.  
Agency general counsel may feel less frustrated by, and therefore feel less 
need to wrest control away from, a legislature controlled by their own 
political party.  One respondent observed this possible entanglement by 
reference to the relationship between an agency and the Attorney General’s 
office: 
[T]he statutes for the Attorney General make it clear that the Attorney 
General has a role in representing the state in certain public interest 
things, and the Attorney General interprets that to say his office gets to 
decide whether to join with the Attorney General of New York, and New 
Hampshire, and Vermont in doing this or that, and not the agency, but 
there were a few issues particularly with our agency that we were on 
different sides of, and a lot of that was political but some was 
philosophical.  In my mind it was political in the sense that there was a 
difference in parties and constituencies, but it was also philosophical in 
“is this the secretary of the department’s decision?” or, “is this the AG’s 
decision?”190 
Future research should probe the relationship between partisan and 
institutional politics in this context and their combined influence on the role 
of the agency general counsel. 
Relatedly, future research should consider whether agency general 
counsel can play a role in limiting the influence of politics in agency 
decision making more broadly.  The problem of agency capture has been a 
central focus of the academic literature on administrative law and a central 
challenge of the regulatory state.191  And yet, there has been very little 
focus on the actual or potential role of agency general counsel in 
 
 188. I19, supra note 95, at 17–18. 
 189. I17, supra note 73, at 13–14. 
 190. I9, supra note 104, at 10. 
 191. See, e.g., STEVEN CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS:  THE POSSIBILITY OF 
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008); ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 30 (2007); Steven Croley, Beyond Capture:  Towards 
a New Theory of Regulation, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 50–69 (D. Levi 
Faur ed., 2011); Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative 
Presidency:  Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 580 (2011). 
See generally Sidney Shapiro, Liz Fischer & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of 
Administrative Law:  Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
463 (2012). 
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constraining the discretion of agencies and therefore the threat of agency 
capture.  Our limited sample has shown that agency general counsel play a 
central role in creating, implementing, and administering the internal 
structures and processes of agency decision making and are positioned to 
provide day-to-day, front-end advice about a wide range of issues.  They are 
ideally situated, if they so choose, to play a disciplining role in agency 
decision making. 
CONCLUSION 
Our account highlights a number of reasons that state agency general 
counsel—and, by extension, state government lawyers generally—deserve 
scholarly attention.  State agencies affect our everyday life in innumerable 
ways, and agency general counsel play a central and often unreviewable 
role in guiding agency decision making and, at least sometimes, shaping 
agency policy.  In light of this, we have taken a first step in addressing the 
scholarly silence on the topic by:  describing the structural and functional 
evolution of the agency general counsel position in North and South 
Carolina; examining the characteristics and career paths of agency general 
counsel and the sources of their authority; and outlining questions for future 
research.  We have barely scratched the surface of possible issues for 
inquiry, but we hope to have laid a useful foundation for future work. 
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 APPENDIX A 
NORTH CAROLINA 
 
Departments of State Government  
Sections 143A, 143B, effective July 1, 2015 






DEPARTMENT OF THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE $11,676,506 197 18 
General 
Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
AUDITOR $11,733,689     
General 
Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
TREASURER $9,734,913  317 7 
General 
Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION $266,733,848 815 4 
General 
Counsel 




$113,940,604 1,909 2 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR $15,945,674 383 2 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 
INSURANCE $38,296,364 407 5 
General 
Counsel 







CULTURAL RESOURCES $64,231,047 664 1 
General 
Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 




REVENUE $80,539,222 12,888 11 
General 
Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 






$162,279,549 2,796 9 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 








COMMERCE $47,261,954 1,671 77 
General 
Counsel 






STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS $6,620,578 67 9 
General 
Counsel 
OFFICE OF THE STATE 
CONTROLLER $22,205,229     
General 
Counsel 






$4,992,437 42 6 None 




Departments of State Government 
Section 1-30-10(A), effective July 1, 2015 













$43,274,207 33 0 None 
DEPARTMENT OF 














$7,021,815,752 1,059 6 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 
















$41,047,872 403 21 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 












$57,564,812 745 4 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 








SOCIAL SERVICES $692,184,042 3,785 9 
General 
Counsel 
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DEPARTMENT OF 



















$670,887,551 2,122 1 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION $4,196,076,102 1,152 5 
Deputy 
Superintendent 






$593,900,859 3,486 18 General Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF 






$98,216,134 765 3 Chief Counsel 
